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First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio
Exterior de Cuba: Act of State and Choice of
Law Aspects of Suing Foreign Governmental
Corporations
In First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba I
(Citibank), the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case
fraught with difficult questions regarding the scope of the act of state
doctrine. Specifically, the Court considered whether an American bank
may counterclaim against a Cuban government trading company for the
value of the American bank's assets expropriated by the Cuban central
government. Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor avoided the act of
state issues by relegating them to the final footnote of the opinion. 2 The
Court's summary treatment of the act of state doctrine marks a contin-
ued decline in the doctrine's scope and importance.
The dispute in Citibank arose out of Citibank's conversion of funds
belonging to Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba (Bancec). The
resolution of the dispute, however, centered on the relationship between
Bancec and the Cuban central government. Despite Cuban legislation
establishing the trading company as an autonomous juridical entity, 3 the
Supreme Court treated the trading company as an alter ego4 of the Cu-
ban central government. The Court held that state trading companies
are liable for the acts of their central government in the same situations
as domestic subsidiaries are liable for the acts of their parent
corporations.3
In April 1960, the Cuban revolutionary government passed legisla-
tion establishing Bancec as "[a]n official autonomous credit institution
for foreign trade . . . with full juridical capacity . . . of its own .... "6
The Cuban government owned all of Bancec's stock, supplied all of its.
1 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).
2 Id. at 2604 n.28.
3 Art. 1, Cuban Law No. 793 (1960) translated in Brief for Petitioner at 2d, First Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).
4 The term "alter ego" is used to indicate an interrelationship between two entities that
justifies disregard of their separate legal status. See 1 W. FLETCHER, FLETCHER'S CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 41.10 (perm. ed. 1983).
3 103 S. Ct. at 2598-2603.
6 Art. 1, Cuban Law No. 793 (1960) translated in Brief for Petitioner at 2d, First Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
capital and received all of its profits.7 Cuba's Minister of State, Ernesto
"Che" Guevara served as Bancec's president, and delegates from govern-
mental ministries comprised Bancec's board of directors 8
In August 1960 Bancec agreed to purchase sugar from the Cuban
national sugar company (INRA), and to sell it to the Cuban Canadian
Sugar Company. 9 An irrevocable letter of credit issued by Citibank sup-
ported the sales agreement. 10 Cuba's central bank (Banco Nacional)
presented Bancec's draft to Citibank for payment on September 15,
1960.11 Two days later, however, Minister of State Guevara ordered
Banco Nacional to nationalize Citibank's Cuban branches.1 2 In re-
sponse, Citibank credited Bancec's draft to Banco Nacional's account
and converted the entire balance as partial compensation for the value of
Citibank's expropriated Cuban assets.' 3 Bancec brought suit in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York to
recover on its letter of credit, and Citibank counterclaimed for a setoff
based on the loss of its expropriated assets.' 4
The Citibank controversy raises two issues with potentially far-reach-
ing ramifications for the future safety of American investment abroad:
first, whether the act of state doctrine bars American courts from exam-
ining the validity of a foreign law creating a putatively separate govern-
mental corporation; and second, if American courts are not so barred by
the doctrine, whether agencies like Bancec may be held liable as alter
egos of their central government for the nationalization of foreign assets.
At trial, the district court brushed over Bancec's act of state defense
and allowed Citibank's setoff.' 5 The court viewed the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act 16 (FSIA) as effecting a waiver of both sovereign immuni-
ties defenses and act of state defenses.' 7 Relying upon Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. First National Cit Bank, 18 the court then held that Bancec was an
alter ego of the Cuban central government.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, dis-
tinguishing the Banco Naaconal case on the ground that Banco Nacional
7 103 S. Ct. at 2593.
8 Id.
SId.
10 Id. at 2593-94.




15 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 505 F. Supp. 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd, 658 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).
16 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1976). For an excellent discussion of the FSIA, see von Mehren,
The Foreign Sovereign Immunittes Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33 (1978).
17 505 F. Supp. at 430.
18 478 F.2d 191 (2d Cir. 1973)(per curiam). In Banco Nacional, the Cuban bank was the
obligor of a loan from Citibank. Citibank sold the collateral and realized more than the out-
standing principal and interest. Banco Nacional sued to recover the excess. Citibank then at-
tempted to setoff the value of its Cuban branches expropriated by Cuba through Banco
Nacional.
[VOL. 9
FIRST NAT'L CITY BANK V BANcEC
played a direct role in the nationalization of Citibank's Cuban assets
while Bancec had not. 19 The court of appeals acknowledged but did not
decide the act of state issue. Instead, it held that American courts may
not ignore statutory distinctions between foreign states and their instru-
mentalities unless the instrumentality played a "key role" in the conduct
at issue in the suit.20 Thus, because Bancec played no role in the nation-
alization, it could not be held liable to Citibank regardless of the applica-
bility of the act of state doctrine.
At the Supreme Court, Bancec advanced three additional argu-
ments against liability. First, Bancec asserted a sovereign immunities de-
fense. 2 1 Bancec argued that the FSIA waived only the Cuban central
government's immunity for the government's wrongful acts, riot Bancec's
immunity for the acts of other Cuban agencies. Second, Bancec argued
that under ordinary choice of law rules, Cuban law rather than Ameri-
can law should govern the case. 22 Under Cuban law, Bancec could not
be held accountable for the central government's liabilities. 23 Third,
Bancec argued that the act of state doctrine barred American courts
from examining the Cuban government's motivation for creating
Bancec, and that without a finding of malevolent motivation, the Court
could not invalidate the separate legal status of a foreign sovereign's
instrumentality. 24
The Supreme Court rejected the Second Circuit's "key role" test
and all three of Bancec's additional arguments. Rather than require that
an instrumentality play a key role in a foreign state's wrongdoing, the
Court applied traditional principles of federal common law to determine
whether to pierce Bancec's corporate veil. 25
While the Court acknowledged that the law of the state of incorpor-
ation normally controls issues relating to the internal affairs of a corpor-
ation,26 it refused to apply Cuban law in Bancec's case. 27 The Court
19 First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 658 F.2d 913, 919
(2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).2 0 
Id at 918.
21 Brief for Respondent at 5-6, First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior
de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).
22 Id at 20-21.
23 Art. 1, Cuban Law No. 793 (1960) translated in Brief for Petitioner at 2d, First Nat'l
City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).
24 Brief for Respondent at 18-20, First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exte-
rior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).
25 103 S. Ct. at 2601-02. The Court primarily looked to Bangor Punta Operations Inc. v.
Bangor & Aroostook R.R., 417 U.S. 703 (1974), for the corporations law applicable to Citibank.
In Bangor Punta, Amoskeag Company purchased 98 percent of the stock of B&A Railroad from
Bangor Punta. The stock was sold at a discount because the railroad had been mismanaged by
Bangor Punta. After the sale, Amoskeag directed the railroad to sue Bangor Punta for misman-
agement. Amoskeag itself lacked standing. Since Amoskeag stood to be the principal benefici-
ary of B&A's action, the Court pierced the subsidiary's corporate veil and rebuffed Amoskeag's
attempt to gain standing through the guise of a proceeding in the name of its subsidiary. 417
U.S. at 713.
26 103 S. Ct. at 2597.
27 Id
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used principles expressed in Anderson v. Abbott 28 to justify its rejection of
Cuban law. In Anderson, the Court declined to apply Delaware .corpora-
tions law to a Delaware corporation on the ground that by so doing, the
corporation could circumvent federal legislative policy.29 Similarly, in
Citibank, the Court feared that the application of Cuban law would im-
properly frustrate the counterclaim exception to sovereign immunity
mandated by the FSIA: "To give conclusive effect to the law of the char-
tering state in determining whether the separate juridical status of its
instrumentality should be respected would permit the state to violate
with impunity the rights of third parties under international law while
effectively insulating itself from liability in foreign courts."'30 The Court
dismissed Bancec's act of state contention in the final footnote of the
opinion:
Bancec does not suggest, and we do not believe, that the act of state
doctrine, . . . precludes this Court from determining whether Citibank
may set off the value of its seized Cuban assets against Bancec's claim.
Bancec does contend that the doctrine prohibits this Court from inquir-
ing into the motives of the Cuban Government for incorporating
Bancec. . . . We need not reach this contention, however, because our
conclusion does not rest on any such assessment.
3
'
In the process of determining which law to apply in Citibank, the
Court also definitively settled the choice of law controversy between ad-
vocates of federal law and advocates of state law in FSIA cases. The
Court held that where state law provides a rule of liability governing
private individuals, the FSIA requires application of that state law to
foreign states. 32 Issues other than liability, however, such as the attribu-
tion of liability among entities of a foreign state, are determined under
federal law.33 After rejecting Cuban law and New York state law, the
Court applied principles of corporations law "common to both interna-
tional law and federal common law ' 34 to determine whether liability for
the expropriations could be attributed to Bancec. 35
While applying federal common law to the attribution of liability
question, the Supreme Court did not directly address the key act of state
issues raised by the Citibank case, leaving the present scope and effect of
28 321 U.S. 349 (1944).
29 Id. at 365.
30 103 S. Ct. at 2597.
31 Id. at 2604 n.28 (citation omitted).32 Id. at 2597 n. 11.
33 Id
34 Id at 2598. The Court asserted that the equitable principles applied in Citibank are
recognized in international law as well as in federal common law. 103 S. Ct. at 2598. The
Court cited Concerning The Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., (Belg. v. Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3, in
support of its assertion. In Barcelona Traction, the International Court of Justice declined to
disregard the separation between a Canadian corporation and its Belgian stockholders. How-
ever, the court recognized the possibility of piercing corporate veils in international practice.
35 The federal common law governing alter egos is beyond the scope of this note. For a
discussion of this law, see I W. FLETCHER, FLETCHER'S CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS, § 41 (perm. ed. 1983).
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the doctrine open to question. The "traditional formulation" of the doc-
trine was first expressed by the Supreme Court in Underhill v. Hernandez:36
"Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judg-
ment on the acts of the government of another done within its own terri-
tory."53 7 The Court reaffirmed this formulation in Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino,3 stating that the doctrine "precludes the courts of this coun-
try from inquiring into the validity of the public acts a recognized for-
eign sovereign power committed within its own territory. '39 Despite the
Court's terse explications, mass confusion continues to bedevil both judi-
cial application 40 and academic discussion 4 1 of the doctrine.
The Supreme Court has, on several occasions, addressed act of state
questions arising out of the nationalization of American assets abroad.
However, no decision prior to Citibank required the Court to determine
when a separately incorporated instrumentality of a foreign government
constitutes an alter ego of its central government. 42
In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba ,'43 a sharply di-
vided Court faced a controversy factually similar to the one in Citibank.
The Banco Nacional Court held that the act of state doctrine did not bar a
counterclaim arising out of Banco Nacional's participation in Cuban acts
36 168 U.S. 250 (1897). Underh'll, which was actually a sovereign immunities case, in-
volved a Venezuelan military dictator who allegedly refused to grant a passport to a U.S. citizen
in an effort to coerce him to stay in Venezuela.
37 Id. at 252.
38 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In Sabbatino, Banco Nacional brought an action for conversion of
documents of title to sugar which were previously expropriated by Cuba. The defendent was
the bankruptcy receiver of the former owner of the sugar. The receiver obtained the documents
without paying Banco Nacional. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground
that Banco Nacional had no right to the documents since the expropriation violated interna-
tional law. The Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the act of state doctrine precluded
American courts from inquiring into the legality of the Cuban expropriation. Congress re-
sponded by passing the Hickenlooper Amendment. Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-633, § 310(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009 (1964) (current version at 22 U.SC. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)). The
Amendment prohibits U.S. courts from declining to reach the merits of an expropriation case
on the basis of the act of state doctrine if the expropriated property finds its way back to the
United States. On remand, Sabbatino succeeded once again in the only case to date which
turned on the Hickenlooper Amendment. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
39 376 U.S. at 401.
40 Compare Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1163 (1981)(antitrust action against OPEC held non-justiciable under the act of state doc-
trine); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 715 (1976)(Powell, J.,
concurring) (act of state doctrine is a variant of the political question doctrine), with 46red Dun-
h'll of London, Inc., 425 U.S. at 705 n.18, and id. at 726-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (majority of
Justices on the Dunhill Court recognized that the doctrine is actually a choice of law rule).
41 See, e.g., Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations: Choice of Law, 87
COM. L.J. 129, 134 (1982)("One is tempted at this point to paraphrase Voltaire's famous quip
about the Holy Roman Empire -'neither Holy, nor Roman, nor an Empire' for this supposed
rule of law is not necessarily linked to Acts, nor does it only serve State interests, nor would
anyone but a Supreme Court Justice have the temerity today to call it a doctrine").
42 Citibank, 103 S. Ct. at 2598 n.12.
43 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
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of expropriation. Although the case failed to produce an act of state rule
which could command a majority, each of the four Justices who issued
opinions agreed that the separation of powers provides the rationale for
the doctrine. 44 Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion adopted the "Bern-
stein exception" to the act of state doctrine. 45 This "exception" allows
courts to disregard the doctrine if the State Department issues a memo-
randum stating that judicial inquiry into the validity of a foreign state's
act will not hinder American foreign relations. A majority of the Jus-
tices, however, expressly rejected the Bernstein exception. 46
The rule expressed in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Banco
Nacional was explicitly applied by the district court in Citibank .47 Doug-
las argued that the applicability of the act of state doctrine should be
governed by "consideration[s] of fair dealing."' 48 Under these principles,
a foreign sovereign waives act of state defenses to counterclaims up to the
amount of the foreign sovereign's original claim. Justice Powell rejected
Douglas' argument and the Bernstein exception as violative of the sepa-
ration of powers.49 He concurred in the result on the ground that the act
of state doctrine should not be implicated unless the court finds that fail-
ure to apply the doctrine would interfere with the "delicate foreign rela-
tions conducted by the political branches. ' 50 Justice Brennan's dissent,
joined by three other Justices, rejected all judicially devised exceptions to
the act of state doctrine. 5'
In A/fred Dunhil of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba,52 the Supreme
Court again refused to apply the act of state doctrine. The majority held
that Cuba's mere refusal to honor an obligation, without more, did not
constitute an act of state.53 Four Justices went on to urge the creation of
a commercial exception to the doctrine, stating: "[T]he concept of the
act of state should not be extended to include the repudiation of a purely
commercial obligation owed by a foreign sovereign or by one of its com-
mercial instrumentalities. '54 A majority of the Justices, however, re-
jected the commercial exception posited by the Dunhill plurality.55
44 See Note, Adudicating Acts of State in Suits Against Foreign Sovereigns: A Pohtiial Qwystn
Analysis, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 722, 732 (1983).
45 406 U.S. at 768 (plurality opinion)(the exception takes its name from the case in which
it was first applied, Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschap-
pij, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954)).
46 First Nat'l, 406 U.S. at 772-73 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 773 (Powell, J., concur-
ring); id at 790 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Some lower courts continue to apply the Bernstein
exception. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 658 F.2d
903, 911 (2d Cir. 1981).
47 505 F. Supp. at 430.
48 406 U.S. at 771 (Douglas, J., concurring).
49 Id at 775 (Powell, J., concurring).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
53 Id at 694.
54 Id at 695 (White, J., concurring).
55 Id at 715 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 725-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Lower
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With this scant stock of Supreme Court precedent, the Court set out
to decide Citibank. The Court's rejection of the Second Circuit's "key
role" requirement for attributing liability to foreign state entities accords
with the principles which undergird the practice of piercing corporate
veils. In effect, the key role test eliminates the possibility of piercing the
corporate veil. Under the key role test, liability extends to an independ-
ent foreign state entity only when the entity is independently liable as a
joint tortfeasor. This test could allow the corporate form to unfairly in-
sulate foreign states from legal responsibility. 56 By repudiating the key
role test, the Supreme Court provided lower courts with sufficient flex-
ibility to avoid this potential inequity.5 7
The argument that the FSIA prohibited attribution of the Cuban
government's liabilities to Bancec is unsupported by authority. The
House report on the FSIA expresses an intent not to affect the "substan-
tive law of liability." 58 In both cases previous to Citibank which required
the Supreme Court to discuss the FSIA, the Court declined to find any
implications of the Act beyond the narrow issue of sovereign immunity.59
The Citibank decision reaffirms the earlier narrow interpretations of the
act.
In deciding that FSIA cases are governed by state rules of liability,
but federal choice of law rules, the Court departed from most previous
lower court holdings. 6° The choice of law provisions in the FSIA and the
Federal Torts Claims Act 6' (FTCA) are substantially the same.62 The
FTCA has been interpreted as mandating both state rules of liability and
state choice of law rules.6 3 As a result, lower courts have applied both
sets of state rules to actions under both statutes.64 The Court in Citibank
recognized the potential harm to American foreign relations latent in
courts have split on the commercial exception issue. Compare Arango v. Guzman Travel Advi-
sors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371, 1380-81 (5th Cir. 1980)(applying the exception), with Int'l Ass'n of
Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1981)(rejecting the exception).
56 See Citibank, 103 S. Ct. at 2597.
57 See De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 567 F. Supp. 1490, 1495 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)(following
Citibank while holding the Chilean national airlines liable for a judgment against the Chilean
central government).
58 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976), reprintedz i 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6627.
59 The two cases were: Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981)(holding that the
FSIA did not prohibit the President from suspending private causes of action pursuant to the
agreement freeing the American hostages in Iran); Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983)(upholding the constitutionality of the FSIA's grant of jurisdiction to
federal courts in certain cases between foreign nationals).
60 Compare De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F. Supp. 259, 266 (D.D.C. 1980)(treating
the choice of law provisions in the FSIA like the choice of law provisions in the Federal Torts
Claims Act), with Citibank, 103 S. Ct. at 2597 n.l (treating the two choice of law provisions
differently).
61 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80 (1976).
62 1 J. MOORE, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 700.180 (1980). Compare 28 U.S.C.
§ 2674 (1976) with 28 U.S.C. § 1606 (1976).
63 Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
64 De Leteier, 502 F. Supp. at 266.
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parochial and divergent state choice of law rules for FSIA cases.65 This
concern, absent in FTCA cases, justifies the dissimilar treatment.66
The most intriguing aspect of the Citibank case is its treatment of the
act of state doctrine. Both Bancec's brief and the Court's final footnote
miss the central act of state issue raised in Ct'tibank. Both demonstrate a
misunderstanding of the doctrine itself. The act of state doctrine is not a
justiciability doctrine which "precludes" a court from reaching the mer-
its of a case.6 7 Rather, it is a super choice of law rule which requires
American courts to treat as valid and binding foreign legislative acts and
judicial decisions regarding certain transactions within the borders of the
foreign state.68 The central, unaddressed issue in Citibank is whether the
Cuban law establishing Bancec as a separate juridical entity is binding
upon American courts under the act of state doctrine.
None of the exceptions to the act of state doctrine applied by the
Court in the past removes C'tibank from the dictates of the doctrine.
First, the Hickenlooper Amendment, 69 passed by Congress to mitigate
the effect of the act of state doctrine, fails to control the Ctibank case
because the issue in Citibank is the juridical independence of Bancec, not
the title to nationalized property. The Hickenlooper Amendment only
affects cases in which the ownership of property located in the United
States is at issue.70 Second, a legislative determination of a governmen-
tal corporation's power to sue and be sued constitutes more than a
"purely commercial act" within the meaning of the Dunhill plurality's
commercial exception. Third, although the State Department provided
a "Bernstein letter,"'7' none of the courts hearing C'tibank were willing to
rely on the uncertain validity of the Bernstein exception. Only the coun-
terclaim exception, proposed in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in
Banco Nacional, would remove Citibank's counterclaim from the tradi-
tional scope of the doctrine. 72
In effect, the Ctibank decision creates a new exception to the act of
state doctrine. The decision at least signals to lower courts that the in-
dependent status of state trading companies should be determined by
65 Citibank, 103 S. Ct. at 2597 n.ll.
66 The classic argument for special treatment of international choice of law questions is
Justice Harlan's opinion in Sabbati'zo, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
67 But cf. Citibank, 103 S. Ct. at 2604 n.28 (implying that the doctrine does preclude adjudi-
cation on the merits).
68 See, e.g., Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 705 n.18; id. at 726 (Marshall, J., dissenting); RESTATE-
MENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 428 comment e (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983);
Henkin, Act of State Today. Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175, 178
(1967); Kirgis, Act of State Exceptions and Choice of Law, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 173 (1972).
69 See supra note 38.
70 Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1060
(1972).
71 505 F. Supp. at 430.
72 First Nat'l, 406 U.S. at 771 (Douglas, J., concurring). The dissenters in Dunhill reluc-
tantly embraced the counterclaim exception in an attempt to avoid adoption of the commercial
exception. 425 U.S. at 733 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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reference to ordinary federal common law principles rather than to legis-
lative acts of foreign states. The decision may also portend the develop-
ment of a general counterclaim exception to the act of state doctrine.
7 3
The confusion surrounding the act of state doctrine cannot be quel-
led without an examination of the web of policy considerations which
relate to the doctrine. 74 Early act of state cases justified invoking the
doctrine by citing the need for mutual respect between nations.75 The
justification in more recent cases focuses on respect for the special role of
the President and Congress in foreign relations.76 This separation of
powers rationale recognizes the embarassment to the political branches
which would flow from a judicial determination contrary to stated for-
eign policy. As long as the courts refuse to determine the legality of a
foreign state's acts, the courts will never validate an act which the State
Department protests. Difficulties with the doctrine arise, however, when
the political branches are unwilling to respond to a foreign act for polit-
ical reasons, but rely on the courts to examine the legality of the act.
Because the act of state doctrine has the effect of extending full faith
and credit to certain acts of foreign states, 77 the considerations justifying
full faith and credit also support the act of state doctrine. Like the full
faith and credit clause, the act of state doctrine functions to permit reli-
ance on the finality of decisions, prevent waste of governmental decision-
making resources, and promote concord between states.
78
These theoretical policy considerations translate into factors which
may palpably affect the safety of American foreign investment. The via-
bility of American multinational corporations depends upon recognition
of their separate juridical status by foreign courts. 79 The Citibank deci-
sion provides precedent for foreign courts which wish to disregard the
independent status of American corporations in order to hold them re-
sponsible for the real or imagined wrongdoings of the United States gov-
ernment.80 The C'tibank decision also creates fear among foreign state
trading companies that their American assets might be seized to compen-
73 Some lower courts have already applied the counterclaim exception. See, e.g.,
Mendendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1374 (2d Cir. 1973).
74 For an excellent attempt at unraveling the rationale for the act of state doctrine and
other FSIA related doctrines, see Dellapenna, Suing Foreign Governments and Their Corporations:
Choice of Law (pts. 1-9), 86 CoM. L.J. 210, 346, 438, 486 (1981), 87 CoM. L.J. 8, 129, 244, 303,
375 (1982).
75 Underhill, 168 U.S. at 250.
76 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
77 See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW, 136 n.57 (3d ed. 1977); cf. authorities
collected at supra note 67.
78 See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 288-89 (1980) (White, J., con-
curring)(refusing to apply the full faith and credit clause because the original adjudicating state
had insufficient interest in the subsequent case).
79 See Hadari, The Structure of the Prvate Multinational Enterprte, 71 MICH. L. REv. 729
(1973).
80 Brief Amicus Curiae of the International Center for Law in Development at 16, First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983).
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sate for wrongdoings unrelated to the trading company's activities.8 '
This fear makes the United States a less attractive trading partner for
state trading companies, 82 and makes state trading companies less attrac-
tive risks for investors. 83 Counterbalancing the economic advantages of
the act of state doctrine is the fact that the doctrine, by insulating acts of
foreign states from judicial scrutiny, may encourage expropriation. 84
At bottom, the economic arguments for and against the act of state
doctrine are unpersuasive. The security of American investment abroad
will depend upon extrinsic forces - revolutionary fervor, American for-
eign policy, international economic conditions - not upon American
precedent putatively justifying expropriation or fear of unfavorable
American judicial reaction.8 5 Moreover, the economic evils avoided by
evading the act of state doctrine may be avoided through other means
more consonant with the American constitutional system. International
arbitration treaties86 and arbitration clauses in foreign investment agree-
ments8 7 may stipulate away difficult choice of law issues like those raised
by the act of state doctrine. In addition, action by the political branches
under the International Claims Settlement Act88 (ICSA) can provide
compensation when the expropriating state is not otherwise willing to
compensate.
The Citibank case itself is an example of the potential effectiveness of
action under the ICSA. The ICSA created a claims commission to ap-
portion the American assets of certain foreign nations among persons re-
quiring compensation for property expropriated by those foreign nations.
The ICSA precluded Cuba from actually recovering any money from
Citibank by freezing Cuban assets in the United States.89 By refusing to
apply the act of state doctrine, the Court merely allowed Citibank to
retain assets which otherwise would have reverted to the Foreign Claims
Settlement Commission for distribution among all parties injured by Cu-
ban expropriations.
The real damage caused by the Citibank decision is to the integrity of




84 See McMathias, Restructuring the Act of State Doctrine: A Blueprint for Legirative Reform, 12
LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369 (1980).
85 See Henkin, supra note 68, at 186.
86 See The Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nation-
als of Other States, entered into force Oct. 14, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575
U.N.T.S. 159 (1966).
87 See generally International Arbitration: A Symposium, 5 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 169
(1980).
88 22 U.S.C. § 1620-45 (1982).
89 22 U.S.C. § 1643 (1982).
90 Cf Swan, Act of State at Bay:. A Plea on Behalf of the Elusive Doctrine, 1976 DUKE L.J. 807
(1967).
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tions.9 1 Cit'ibank and other recent act of state cases bring into question
the impartiality of AMerican courts. In these highly politicized cases, the
Supreme Court has gone to great lengths to find against America's ene-
mies, but has failed to develop a clear rationale for its decisions.9 2 The
reputation of American courts for impartiality should not be risked.
That reputation is itself a valuable inducement to trade with the United
States. The erosion of the act of state doctrine also retards the growth of
the trust among nations necessary for the development of a strong inter-
national legal system. By refusing to respect the governmental acts of
foreign states, the United States encourages other states to disregard
American governmental acts. Viewed in this light, Ctibank represents a
small victory of national egoism over enlightened self-interest.
Two unlikely events could rectify the unfortunate result in Citibank.
Legislative or judicial action reinstating the traditional act of state doc-
trine would repair the integrity of the American judicial system, set an
example of respect among nations, and require little of the Court's pre-
cious decision-making resources. Alternatively, judicial recognition of
the act of state doctrine as a choice of law rule which in effect acts as an
international full faith and credit clause, could also lead to a satisfactory
solution to the act of state controversy. Lower courts, aware of the na-
ture of the doctrine, could apply principles developed in the Supreme
Court's full faith and credit decisions to decide act of state cases.93 Un-
fortunately, the Citibank decision lessens the likelihood that either of these
salutary approaches will govern future act of state disputes.
-MARK ANDERSON FINKELSTEIN
91 See Henkin, supra note 68, at 187-89.
92 The opinions issued in First Nat'l Citibank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759
(1972) and Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) clearly
support this conclusion.
93 Particularly instructive are the Court's decisions in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light
Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980) and Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)(California allowed to apply
its own law to determine the extent of Nevada's sovereign immunity).
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